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Summary findings
To control the expansion of government contingent  obligations to cover liabilities emerging from directed
liabilities and reduce fiscal vulnerability, one must be  credit, may not be sustainable.
able to identify and measure them. Brixi, Ghanem, and  In Macedonia, the present fiscal equilibrium may be
Islam discuss how this may be done and demonstrate  temporary because the stock of existing contingent
how the assessment of fiscal adjustment may change  liabilities could add 2 to 4 percent of GDP to future
substantially when a broader picture of government  deficits. And methods used to reduce the "traditional"
liabilities is included.  deficit are unlikely to be sustainable without further
They base their analysis on experience in analyzing  modification.
fiscal adjustment in the Czech Republic and Macedonia.  Brixi, Ghanem, and Islam conclude that governments:
Their work demonstrates the importance of including  Must find better ways to identify and evaluate
contingent liabilities when assessing the magnitude of the  contingent liabilities arising from the banking system,
true fiscal adjustment and when analyzing fiscal  nonbanking financial institutions, public enterprises, or
sustainability.  the contingent and direct liabilities of subnational
To the extent that explicit expenditures are shifted off-  governments.
budget or replaced by guarantees, the achieved  *  Need to better manage their risks - for example,
improvement  in fiscal balances is overstated.  building adequate reserve funds and hedging risk, where
For the Czech Republic, adjustment may have been  possible.
overstated by some 3 to 4 percent of annual GDP. A  *  Should examine the implications of the bias toward
stabilization program accompanied by a build-up of  adding contingent liabilities and develop administrative
contingent  liabilities, particularly state guarantees and  reform as part of analyzing budget management.
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Faced with external and domestic pressures governments all around the world have been
lowering their fiscal deficits.  At the same time, economists are increasingly coming to realize
that focusing exclusively on traditional measurements of the fiscal deficit to assess the extent of
fiscal adjustment that has been attained can be misleading for two reasons.  First, as Selowsky
(1998) points out, quantitative improvements in fiscal policy have not always been accompanied
by progress in the "quality" of adjustment. Traditional deficit measures (government deficits on
a cash basis) do not shed sufficient light on two key dimensions of "quality": sustainability and
efficiency'.  Second, governments can reduce their measured deficit without carrying out any
"true" adjustment. Easterly (1998) argues that fiscal adjustment can be just an "illusion" when it
lowers the budget deficit but leaves government net worth unchanged. 2 When an outside agent
forces a reduction in a government's conventional deficit, it often responds by lowering asset
accumulation or by increasing hidden or off-budget liabilities giving the "illusion" of a fiscal
adjustment. Fiscal adjustment of this nature may not be either sustainable or efficient. This
paper focuses mostly on the issue of sustainability.
Building-up explicit or implicit government contingent liabilities is an important way of
reducing the measured (traditional) fiscal deficit while avoiding difficult adjustment.  There are
many examples of this type of government behavior.  In Italy the railways have raised funds
through the financial markets to cover their deficits for many years with government agreement
and an explicit guarantee from the treasury. Yet, those operations had no impact on the
measured fiscal deficit or on the measured stock of government liabilities. 3 Similarly, faced with
l Efficiency  is a broad  concept  that  includes  issues such  as (a) where  should  the government  spend  resources  (b)
what should  be the nature  of its intervention  and (c) how should  it obtain  fiscal  revenues  in  the least  distortionary
manner.
2 For other  examples  and explanations  why change  in net worth  is the right  conceptual  measure  of the deficit  see
Buiter  (1983  and 1985)  or Blejer  and  Cheasty  (1993).
3  See Glatzel  (1998).
2the Gramm-Rudman constraint on fiscal deficits, the US Congress has reduced direct lending by
$50 billion and increased loan guarantees by $178 billion, replacing budgetary outlays by
explicit contingent liabilities.4 Implicit liabilities often arise from the financial sector.  The
savings and loan crisis in the US which eventually cost the government about US $200 billion is
a notable example.5 In many other countries governments have used financial institutions to
"hide" their fiscal deficits often by asking them to extend subsidized loans to public entities.6
Several factors are working to increase government contingent liabilities and fiscal risk in
countries around the world: rapidly increasing volumes of private capital flows leading to fast
growth of financial systems and volatility in these flows; 7 transformation of the state from
financing of services to guaranteeing particular outcomes; and related to both of these, moral
hazards in the markets; and fiscal opportunism of policymakers.  Transition and emerging-
market economies face particularly large fiscal risks.  Their dependence on private foreign
financing, weak regulatory and legal enforcement systems, often distorted incentive structures,
opaque ownership structures, and low information disclosure, elevate failures in the financial and
corporate sectors.  Such failures, in turn, often generate political pressures on governments to
intervene through bailouts.
A first step towards controlling the expansion of government contingent liabilities and
reducing fiscal risk is being able to identify and measure them.  In this paper we discuss how this
may be done and demonstrate how assessment of fiscal adjustment may change substantially
when a broader picture of government liabilities is included.  The paper is based on our
experience in analyzing fiscal adjustment in the Czech Republic and Macedonia.  The Czech
4  See Rubin  (1997)
5  See Kotlikoff  (1993)
6  Easterly  (1998)  presents  several  examples  of this.
7The  relationship  between  financial  flows  and fiscal  deficits  work in two  ways: large  capital outflows  can increase
implicit  contingent  liabilities,  large  capital  inflows  in poorly  regulated  financial  sectors  set the stage  for the
3case provides an example of the deliberate use of guarantees and other support provided through
off-budget institutions, which have reduced the (traditional) measured fiscal deficit and public
debt. The Macedonia example demonstrates how ignoring implicit liabilities arising from
financial sector and enterprise restructuring could lead to a serious underestimation of the extent
of fiscal adjustment needed to ensure sustainability. Both case studies provide examples of how
to deal with some difficult conceptual and measurement issues when trying to estimate
government contingent liabilities.
The paper is divided into five sections. After this introduction, section 2 presents a simple
framework for identifying and classifying contingent liabilities.  Sections 3 and 4 describe our
work in the Czech Republic and Macedonia.  Our main conclusions and suggestions for future
work are summarized in section 5.
2.  A Simple Framework for Identifying Government Liabilities
As in Polackova (1998) we divide government liabilities into four types: direct explicit,
direct implicit, contingent explicit, and contingent implicit (table 1). Government direct explicit
liabilities are specific obligations that will fall due with certainty and are defined by law or
contract. They are the subject of traditional fiscal analysis and include repayment of sovereign
debt, expenditures based on budget law in the current fiscal year, and expenditures in the long
term for legally mandated items, such as civil service salaries and pensions.  Government direct
implicit liabilities represent a moral obligation or political, rather than legal, burden on the
government that will occur with certainty. They often arise as a presumed consequence of public
expenditure policies in the longer term.  For example, in a public pay-as-you-go pension scheme,
in a country where the government is not legally obliged to pay future public pensions, future
accumulation  of implicit  contingent  liabilities  and even  without  outflows  increase  fiscal  risk. Moreover,  outflows
4pensions constitute a direct (expected with certainty) implicit (political but not legal) liability.
Explicit contingent liabilities represent government's legal obligations to make a payment only if
a particular event occurs.  State guarantees and financing through state-guaranteed institutions
are examples of this type of liability.  Implicit contingent liabilities are those that are not
officially recognized until a failure occurs. The triggering event, the value at risk, and the
required size of the government outlay are uncertain. In most countries, the financial system
represents the most serious source of implicit contingent liabilities for government. International
experience indicates that markets expect the government to support the financial system far
beyond its legal obligation in order to prevent, or in the aftermath of, a systemic crisis.
Table 1  The Fiscal  Risk Matrix:  Examples
Liabilities  Direct  Contingent
(obligation  in any event)  (obligation  if a particular  event  occurs)
.EXxplicit  *  Foreign and domestic  . State  guarantees  for  non-sovereign  borrowing  and  obligations
sovereign borrowing  issued to  subnational governments and public  and  private sector
Government  (loans contracted and  entities (development banks)
liability as  securities issued by central  . Umbrella  state  guarantees  for various  types  of  loans  (mortgage
recognized by  government)  loans, student loans, agriculture loans, small business loans)
a law or  . Budgetary expenditures  . Trade and exchange rate guarantees issued by the state
contract  *  Budgetary expenditures  . Guarantees on borrowing by a foreign sovereign state
legally binding in the  * State guarantees on private investments
long-term (civil servants'  * State insurance  schemes (deposit  insurance, income from private
salaries and pensions)  pension funds, crop insurance, flood insurance, war-risk insurance)
Implicit  . Future public pensions (as  * default of subnational government, and public or private entity on
A "moral"  opposed to civil service  non-guaranteed debt and other obligations
obligation of  pensions) if not required  * liability clean-up in entities under privatization
government  by law  . banking failure (support beyond state insurance)
which reflects  * social security schemes if  . investment failure of a non-guaranteed pension fund, employment
public and  not by law  fund, or social security fund (social protection of small investors)
interest-  * future health care  a default  of  central  bank  on  its  obligations  (foreign  exchange
group  financing if not by law  contracts, currency defense, balance of payment stability)
pressures  a future recurrent cost of  . bail-outs following a reversal in private capital flows
public investments  * environmental recovery, disaster relief, military financing,
The  liabilities  listed  above  refer to the fiscal  authorities,  not the central  bank.
In order that governments may better manage their resources, volatility in the
government's financing requirement and changes in overall government risk exposure resulting
may be prompted by the accumulation of contingent liabilities.
5from off budget activities should be considered in the design of government programs. The value
of predictability is particularly high for governments that have: (a) restricted access to
borrowing, (b) low capacities to manage risk, and (c) low risk preference.  Risk adverse
governments would prefer to know their financing requirements with certainty.  But when facing
constraints on the cash deficit, such as deficit "targets," or when having short planning horizons,
policy makers may prefer to provide off budget support to conceal the impact on expenditures
and taxpayers (as is the case with the provision of guarantees in many emerging markets).8 The
formation of reserve funds, of maximum limits on government liabilities under different
scenarios for contingent liabilities, or of a hedging strategy, may reduce the potential harm when
contingent liabilities fall due.  But these measures raise other problems related to overall
management of reserve resources, calculations of the required amounts of contingent funds
needed, and appropriate use of derivatives.
The first  step  in  attaining fiscal  stability is  for policymakers  to  identify,  classify,  and
understand  the  full  range  of  fiscal  risks.  Understanding  their  consequences  will  at  least
encourage policymakers to avoid risks that are bound to surface in a politically meaningful time
horizon. For risks that extend beyond that timeframe, fiscally sound behavior may depend on
coercion. Policymakers are more likely to gravitate to fiscally sound decisions if the media, the
public,  investors,  credit-rating  agencies,  and  multilateral  institutions  understand  the
government's  fiscal performance  in its  entirety and  if there  are credible  sanctions when the
government exposes the state to excessive risks and attempts to conceal those risks.
The  two  case  studies  presented  in  the  following  sections  attempt  to  use  this  simple
framework to identify and evaluate key fiscal risks in the Czech Republic and Macedonia. The
8  The provision  of an explicit  government  guarantee  is generally  only  a first best instrument  of support  when
sharing  risk  with another  economic  agent  is the objective.  Defining  guarantees  narrowly  and placing limits  on the
6Czech analysis highlights that off budget fiscal interventions, mainly  in  the form of  explicit
guarantees and directed lending by government has led to a rapid accumulation of government
liabilities. True government net worth therefore is lower than a simple evolution of fiscal deficits
would  indicate.  While  these  debts  may  be  manageable  at  the  present  time,  if  government
liabilities continue to grow at the rate at which they have in the past, they will present a threat to
future fiscal stability.  In the Macedonian case, the threat to fiscal sustainability comes from the
recognition of past implicit contingent liabilities and a substantial accumulation of further such
liabilities.  The key issues here are that slow structural reforms can increase debt from implicit
contingent liabilities. The stock of debt (and therefore also changes in net worth) resulting from
the recognition  of  implicit  contingent  liabilities may  vary  according  to  both  economic and
political decisions made in Macedonia.  The effect on the debt increases will depend very much
on the manner in which government decides to repay its obligations (on the maturity structure
and terms of the debt, which is determined upon recognition of these liabilities).
3. What Is the "True" Fiscal Deficit in the Czech Republic?
T'he Czech Republic has been known for balanced government budgets.  In contrast to
most countries, however, fiscal performance in the Czech Republic encompasses a significant
amount of government activities financed outside the budgetary system.  These activities
generate fiscal risks.  Recently, these off-budget fiscal risks have become more visible, as state
guarantees and agencies that are either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the government
have generated significant claims on the budget. Given the magnitude of off-budget activities,
fiscal analysis in the Czech Republic needs to identify all the main activities of a fiscal nature in
order to determine the "true fiscal deficit."  Excluding quasi-fiscal activities of the central bank,
maximum  exposure  of government  for each guarantee  as well as the overall  set of guarantees  provided  helps limit
7the Czech National Bank, the "hidden" part of the fiscal deficit comprises two main components:
(a) net spending on programs of a fiscal nature by special, off-budget institutions (Konsolidacni
Banka, Ceska Inkasni, Ceska Financni 9 and the National Property Fund) and (b) implied
subsidies extended through state guarantees.  For financial relationships of the special
institutions see chart 1.  (For non-standard operations of Czech National Bank see annex 1.)
rovernment debt.
Ceska Financni has financed two blocks of programs geared toward bank revitalization.  One block, in the
total amount of approximately CZK35bn, is financed and guaranteed by the Czech National Bank.  The other, called
the Stabilization Program, in the amount of about CZK12bn is financed through Konsolidacni Bankia, and thus
guaranteedy the governiment. It is only the latter block, which is considered in the "true" deficit calculation.  It is
included as an activity of Konsolidacni Banka.
8Chart  1  Financial Relationships of special, off-budget institutions
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9For any given year, net public spending by these institutions includes cash outlays on new
programs in the form of directed credits and asset purchases'°, and interest expenditures. This
spending is adjusted for debt collection, interest revenue, and other revenue from programs.
Table 2 shows the components of the "hidden" deficit. In the remainder of this section we
describe each row of this table in more detail.
Table 2: Sources of the "Hidden" Deficit in the Czech Republic (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Konsolidacni Banka (KOB)'  7.7  7.3  4.5  0.9  10.6  28.8
net public expenditures
Ceska Inkasni (CI)  20.1  6.6  4.9  4.8  3.1  2.7
net public expenditures
Ceska Financni (CF)  0.6L  1.8"
net public expenditures
National Property Fund (N1PF)  4.2  8.2  4.3  1.9  2.0  2.6
net public expenditures (excl. KOB, CI)
State  guarantees  0.1  -0.4  1.3  14.9  51.5  26.7
Implicit subsidy (risk-adjusted)
Total (%GDP)  3.2  1.9  1.1  1.5  4.1  3.5
'  Activities of KOB include a credit to finance Stabilization Program of CF.  Therefore, the table includes only interest payments by CF (which
are  then reported as interest income of KOB).
2 These figures are interest payments to KOB on credit taken by CF from KOB to finance Stabilization Program.  In addition, CF paid interest
CZKO.8  bn and CZK2.8 bn in 1997 and 1998, respectively, to Czech National Bank on its credit from Czech National Bank to finance
Consolidation Program.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Konsolidacni Banka, Ceska Financni and National Property Fund.
Until 1993, off-budget programs had mainly dealt with pre-transition problems inherited
by the banking sector. These programs had been financed through Konsolidacni Banka. This
bank was capitalized by the National Property Fund (the privatization agency whose revenues
are derived from asset sales and borrowing on domestic markets), and borrowing from the Czech
National Bank.'"  In 1995, the Ministry of Finance established Ceska Inkasni, a non-bank
financial institution with the mandate of cleaning-up the portfolio of a state-owned bank, the
CSOB.  Covered by a guarantee issued by the National Property Fund, Ceska Inkasni obtained a
credit from the CSOB and used this credit to purchase CSOB's bad assets at face value.
'°  The assets purchased through off-budget programs are of extremely low quality.  Therefore, the analysis
considers asset purchases as a spending program rather than a financial transaction.
Debt to Czech National Bank still constitutes about one half of Konsolidacni Banka's total debt.
10During 1996-98, a new bank consolidation and stabilization program was launched to deal
with newly emerging problems in the banking sector. In order to implement these programs, the
Czech National Bank established Ceska Financni, another non-bank financial institution. In
1998, Ceska Finaneni had in its portfolio non-performing assets purchased at face value from
small and medium-sized banks, (in the amount of about CZK50bn, which is 3% of GDP), which
it financed through borrowing (one third) from Konsolidacni Banka and (two thirds) from the
Czech National Bank.
The Czech National Bank has also financed other bank rescue operations, which have
become the source of a further (CZK161bn, over 9% of GDP) addition to its portfolio of
substandard assets in 1998. Out of the total amount of sub-standard assets held by the Czech
National Bank, the government covers the risk for 12% of the assets.  A further, 22% of these
assets are in the form of a credit from the Czech National Bank to Konsolidacni Banka and thus
are indirectly also covered by government.
Aside from the bank rescue operations, Konsolidacni Banka and, less directly, the National
Property Fund have also financed government programs to support troubled insurance
companies, public hospitals and the Czech Railways, to build infrastructure, and to clean up
industrial enterprises for privatization (see Table 3). The National Property Fund has partly
financed these programs from privatization revenues but partly also from its debt issuance.
Calculation of contributions to the "true" fiscal deficit by the National Property Fund exclude
principle repayments and thus do not reflect the ongoing financing of pre-1993 programs by
National Property Fund.  In addition, both Konsolidacni Banka and the National Property Fund
have accumulated their own contingent liabilities in the form of various guarantees.  12
12  Risk assessment  of guarantees  issued  by the National  Property  Fund  and Konsolidacni  Banka  is not
available.  Therefore,  calculation  of  the  "true"  fiscal  deficit  only  includes  the  imnplicit  subsidy  extended  through  net
11Table 3: Programs covered by National Property Fund, 1993-98 (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Financing environment rehabilitation  0.01  0.1  0.8  1.0  1.4  2.1
Financing the development of railway route  0.1  0.01  0.2
Support to  state-owned  enterprises  (including  liability  2.1  0.5  0.9  0.3  0.2  0.3
clean up)
Support to agricultural businesses  6.1  1.0
Bond Interest  2.1  1.5  1.6  0.5  0.4  0.5
National  Property  Fund's  "hidden"  fiscal  deficit  4.2  8.2  4.3  1.9  2.0  2.9
(excluding transfers to  KOB, CI  and CF and  transfers
according to state budget law)
Others, already included in hidden deficit calculation:
Health insurance companies (through KOB)'  0.8  0.4  0.4
Support to aviation companies (through KOB)'  0.1  0.02
Provisions to Ceska Inkasni (CI) '  3.4  10.3  5.5  6.0
Stabilization program of CF (through KOB)'  0.6  1.8
Others, included in the reported budget deficit:
Transfers according to state budget law  9.5  19.4  10.7
'These items  are excluded  from the 'true" deficit  calculation.  National  Property  Fund's expenditures  related  to KOB,  Cl and CF are accounted
for as financing  items  of these institutions.
Source:  National  Property  Fund's Annual  Reports
The impact of guarantees on the hidden deficit is estimated as the net implicit subsidy
provided through guarantees in a given year from the portfolio of guarantees issued in that year,
or the potential fiscal cost of government obligations, which will emerge from the guarantee in
the future. If the amount of this subsidy had been transferred to a guarantee reserve fund the
same year the guarantee was issued, it would have served to cover potential future claims
emerging from the guarantee. The cost of default would be paid from the guarantee reserve fund
and thus would not affect the budget and the deficit.
spending by the special institutions and through guarantees issued directly by the state, but not guarantees issued by
special  institutions.
12Table 4: Guarantees Issued (face values, CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Very  high  risk (90%)  0  0  0  10.8  51.7  31.0
High  risk (30%)  0  0  0  16.2  20.3  0
Medium  risk (15%)  5.0  0  13.3  3.0  5.8  7.8
Low risk (5%)  3.7  0  1.8  0  0  87.0
Total  8.7  0  15.1  30.0  77.8  125.8
Assessment of each guarantee and its underlying project had preceded the estimation  of their
future fiscal costs.  Projects were ranked according to their risk.  Accordingly, the default risk of
each  guarantee  was  estimated.  The  probability  of  default  was  determined  by  careful
consideration of each loan. Table 4 shows the amounts of guarantees issued according to their
risk ranking.  The implicit subsidy (risk adjusted) imbedded in state guarantees is calculated by
multiplying  the loan amount for which  a guarantee was issued  by the default  risk. To  avoid
double accounting, the net implicit subsidy, or the net contribution to  the hidden deficit in  a
given year, is defined as the total  implicit subsidy provided in  a given year minus  guarantee
claims paid from the budget and reported in the budget that year.  Table 5 provides  the risk-
adjusted  amounts  of  guarantees  issued  each  year  and  the  claims  paid  from  the  budget on
guarantee defaults each year. (For calculation of the guarantee component of hidden deficit and
hidden government liabilities, and of expected guarantee claims on future budgets see annex 2.)
13Table 5: Guarantees Contribution to the Hidden Deficit (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Very  high (90%)  0  0  0  9.7  46.5  27.9
High  (30%)  0  0  0  4.9  6.1  0
Medium  (15%)  0.7  0  2.0  0.4  0.9  1.2
Low (5%)  0.2  0  0.1  0  0  4.4
Sub Total  0.9  0  2.1  15.0  53.5  33.4
Budget  paid out (-)  -0.8  -0.4  -0.8  -0.1  -2.0  -6.7'
Total  0.1  -0.4  1.3  14.9  51.5  26.7
(as % of GDP)  0.0  -0.  0  0.1  1.0  3.1  1.5
It turns  out that the "true" fiscal deficit in the Czech Republic (table 6), though
significantly higher that the deficit calculated through conventional methods, is comparable with
deficits of other Central European countries.  Therefore the Czech Republic's fiscal performance,
contrary to the widely accepted view, is not noteworthy for its fiscal restraint. Moreover, if left to
grow as in the past, the off-budget risk to future fiscal stability can increase significantly.
Presently, there is no institutional mechanism in the country mandated to keep a check on
government off-budget obligations and the ensuing fiscal risk.  And demands on new guarantees
and further programs to be fmanced through various off-budget agencies are growing.
Table  6: Czech  Republic  "True" Fiscal  Deficit,  1993-1998  (% of GDP)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998
Reported  fiscal  deficit  -0.5  -1.3  0.3  0.5  1.1  2.1
"Hidden"  fiscal  deficit in  the special  institutions  3.2  1.9  1.0  0.5  1.0  2.0
(KOB,  CI, CF  and NPF)
"Hidden"  fiscal  deficit  in guarantees  0  0  0.1  1.0  3.1  1.5
net hidden  subsidy  (risk-adjusted)
"True"  fiscal deficit  2.7  0.6  1.4  2.0  5.2  5.6
(including  the special  institutions  and guarantee  net hidden subsidy)
The first  troubling  fact implied by the  above discussion  is the  sharp increase  in  the
amount and risk of guarantees issued by the state.  The bulk of the increase has emerged from the
government's  support to banks and to the Czech Railways.  In 1997 and 1998 the government
issued CZK 22bn (1.4% of GDP) guarantee to Czech National Bank on some of its very risky
14lending for bank restructuring and CZK 31bn (nearly 2% of GDP) guarantee to a bank (CSOB)
on its  claim against a Slovak financial institution (Slovenska Inkasni).  To support the Czech
Railways, the government issued two guarantees, each over CZK 20bn with a very high default
risk in  1996 and  1997 on railway modernization.  The hidden cost of guarantees has already
started to show as a growing claim on the budget emerging from guarantee defaults.  Claims on
budget increased from about CZK lbn annually during 1993-96 to CZK 2bn in 1997 and almost
CZK 7bn in 1998.13
Another, related, troubling fact  is the rapidly increasing level of hidden public  liabilities.
Stocks of these liabilities have been accumulated outside the budgetary system as a result of the
hidden deficits  (annual flows) mainly in  the form  of borrowing by the special institutions to
finance  their  government  programs.14  Table  7  shows  approximate  levels of  hidden public
liabilities,  excluding  non-guaranteed  quasi-fiscal  operations  of  the  Czech  National  Bank.
Comparison of the figures of hidden deficits in table 2 and the resulting hidden liabilities in table
7 will illustrate the extent of cross-financing among the special institutions and, also, the extent
of the use of privatization revenues to partly cover the cost of off-budget programs.
13  Since  the guarantee  claims  paid from the budget  have contributed  to the reported  deficit,  the "hidden"  deficit
that emerges  from  guarantees  only includes  the difference  between  the hidden subsidy  extended  by the government
through  new guarantees  and the claims  mostly  on guarantees  issued  in previous  years. Unadjusted  for guarantee
claims,  the hidden  subsidy  through  guarantees  has actually  reached  CZK55bn  and CZK32bn  in 1997  and 1998,
respectively.
14  Hidden  public liabilities  are calculated  on gross basis. The analysis  focuses  on gross  liabilities  because  the
quality  of directed  loans extended  and assets  purchased  through  off-budget  programs  is so extremely  low  and their
potential  value is on average  estimated  around  10 percent  (3 percent for CI, less  than 10 percent  in CF and under  20
percent  in KOB).
15Table 7.  Hidden Public Liabilities (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Konsolidacni Banka (KOB) X  79  81  79  70  86  98
(net of provisions and reserves)
Ceska Inkasni (CI)  20  27  25  17  8  7
(net of provisions and reserves)
National Property Fund (FNM)  29  33  40  22  17  15
State guarantees  3  3  6  28  74  107
(risk adjusted guarantees outstanding)
Hidden  public liabilities  131  144  150  137  185  226
(net of provisions and reserves)
Hidden public liabilities (% of GDP)  13.1  12.5  11.1  8.9  11.2  12.7
(net ofprovisions  and reserves)
Provisions and reserves of KOB and CI  19  24  42  59  71  84
Gross hidden public liabilities  150  168  192  196  256  310
(not adjusted for provisions and reserves)
Reported gross government debt  159  162  154  155  173  194
Reported gross government debt (% of GDP)  15.8  14.1  11.5  10.1  10.5  10.9
1 Activities of Konsolidacni Banka include financing of the Stabilization Program of Ceska Financni.  Therefore, the table does not include
Ceska Financni as a separate entity.
Sources:  Konsolidacni Banka, Ceska Inkasni and National Property Fund.
Off-budget programs,  such  as  guarantees  and  support extended  through  Konsolidacni
Banka, National Property Fund, PGRLF and other, possibly new, agencies and guarantee funds,
impose cost on taxpayers with a delay but with no discount.  As it has already started to happen,
past hidden deficits and servicing of the hidden government debt outside the budgetary system
gradually generates claims on government budget.
One source of budget claims are state guarantees.  Assuming no new state guarantees
issued, the budget may need to cover about CZK 4 bn annually in the future years, and CZK 33
bn in year 2002 if the debt of Slovenska Inkasni to CSOB is not resolved.  Table 8 builds  on
table  5 and, taking into account  individual guaranteed debt repayment schedule, it shows the
expected guarantee claims on future budgets.  Figures in table 8 are obtained by multiplying the
default  risk by  annual  scheduled payments.  (See  annex 2  for  details.)  More  conservative
assumptions for default risk would increase the estimated claims on budget resources.
16Table 8.  Estimated Guarantee Claims on the Budget (CZK bn)
Guarantees  Default  Total  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  1999-  1999-
out-standing  risk  Claim  2003  2030
in 1998
284.8'  Avg. 38%  107.4  3.3  4.9  5.4  33.3  3.7  50.5  97.8
This amount excludes most recent loan guarantee commitments in the amount of CZK17.6 bn that are expected to be implemented in 1999.
Another  source of future  claims on the budget is Konsolidacni Banka.  Konsolidacni
Banka experienced about CZK 14.4bn loss in 1998, which will be covered by state bonds issue.
Assuming no new programs, the analysis of Konsolidacni Banka's  asset portfolio indicates that
its  future  losses  and  potential  claims  on  the  state  budget  are  likely  to  stabilize  in  the
neighborhood of about CZK 6bn annually in 1999-2001.  However, new government programs
that require further borrowing by Konsolidacni Banka without generating adequate revenues will
further increase Konsolidacni Banka's debt service and, thus, losses.
Without  further privatization  revenues,  National  Property  Fund  will  need  to  further
borrow to meet its commitment vis-a-vis Ceska Financni, Ceska Inkasni, environmental recovery
and railway development, and to cover principle repayments for its obligations.t5 To meet its
obligations, analysis of the National  Property Fund's  commitments, excluding those  vis-a-vis
Konsolidacni Banka, suggests that the Fund will annually need about CZK 15 bn during  1999-
2003 and about CZK 33 bn in 2004.
In the medium to long run, off-budget financing of government activities, guarantees and
other contingent liabilities, surface as increases in government debt.  In the Czech Republic, the
expected increase in public debt by the amount of hidden public liabilities estimated around 12.7
percent of 1998 GDP (see table 7) is significant but not disastrous.  What appears as disastrous is
the dynamic  in the rise of the hidden public  liabilities. Clearly, the levels of new guarantees
issued and new government  programs entrusted for financing to  Konsolidacni Banka are not
17sustainable.  Their continued growth at the current pace may in a  few years  endanger fiscal
stability, and thus  play against the country's  objective of  EU accession.  The  situation will
appear more serious if  "implicit" government liabilities were included in the deficit and debt
calculations.
Moreover,  off-budget  programs  contribute  only  marginally  to  achieving main  policy
objectives of the government  and,  in some  instances, may  even undermine  these objectives.
What have been the results of off-budget programs in the Czech Republic?  To support reforms
and prevent problems from recurrence?  Or just to pay for failures that are likely to occur again?
A brief overview suggests that many off-budget programs, such as bail-outs of banks and health
insurance companies, have  done the latter.  Sometimes, programs, which  did not  qualify for
budgetary support (for example an  additional subsidy to  Railways) did  qualify for assistance
outside the budget (such as a very risky guarantee extended to Railways).  Moreover, often, these
programs have implied that government will help again in a case of future failures, and thus have
generated moral hazard among market agents, reducing their incentives to improve productivity
and competitiveness.  This way, the objective of EU accession and integration with European
markets, which  poses high  requirements  on competitiveness  of banks  and  enterprises  in the
Czech economy, may have been undermined.
4.  Is Fiscal Stabilization in Macedonia sustainable?
Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia's macroeconomic stabilization has often
been referred to as a remarkable success.  In 1992 FYR Macedonia had a general government
budget deficit of 9.6% of GDP, and 13.4% of GDP in 1993. The country had little access to
foreign finance, had an almost non-existent domestic bond market, and financed its deficit
15  The initial  issuance  of National  Property  Fund's obligations  had  been used mainly  to capitalize  Konsolidacni
Banka. The following  ones than to cover its other  commitments.
18through money creation. As a result, inflation reached 2000% in 1992. The government adopted
a stabilization program in 1994, the primary elements of which were a dramatic reduction in
expenditures relative to GDP, the adoption of a fixed exchange rate, some changes in the tax
system and strengthened tax collection efforts.  By 1997, the budget deficit was -0.4% of GDP
and the inflation rate 4%.
This adjustment is impressive.  But is it sustainable? There are two parts of the
sustainability question: (a) The traditional analysis focuses on whether the current pattern of
expenditures and revenues, not including contingent liabilities is sustainable and (b) the more
complete analysis accounting for off-budget liabilities as well. Quite different answers are
possible depending on which track is followed. In FYR Macedonia, the government had built a
large stock of direct and contingent liabilities that has increased fiscal risks and threaten future
budgetary stability.  There are two main sources of contingent liabilities: those emanating from
the financial sector, and those from enterprise restructuring/privatization.16
The Macedonian government is under strong pressure to resolve the problem of the frozen
foreign currency deposits that it inherited from the former Yugoslavia.  These are household
deposits in foreign currency which were deposited in commercial banks in the former
Yugoslavia and which the commercial banks were required to redeposit with the National Bank
of Yugoslavia. Since 1991, these deposits have been frozen, and since independence the
Macedonian government has recognized these deposits as a liability of the state.
These liabilities are no longer implicit but their fiscal effects are contingent on decisions
taken by the government regarding the terms and structure of its debt. The Government owes
about DM 1.2 billion (21% of GDP) towards some 770,000 foreign currency accounts held by
Macedonians.  The Govemrnent is currently considering several options to deal with this
19problem.  The most recently discussed solution is to swap these deposits with bonds of 1  5-year
maturity, which would bear an interest rate of 1.5%. At this low interest rate and assurning no
exchange risk, the debt service on these bonds would average 2.7% of GDP over the next 10
years.
The banking sector is an important source of implicit contingent liabilities as past
experience in Macedonia has shown.  Bank recapitalization and restructuring has already cost the
budget over 2% of GDP per year since 1995. Yet, incomplete structural reform has meant that
the financial system's portfolio of bad debts has grown.  It is now estimated that roughly 40% of
the system's loans are compromised. Even after all pro  -or j are accounted for, and after
accounting for the total capital of the banking system, the total uncovered exposure (for balance
sheet items) in the financial sector could be as high as 9% of GDP. 17
Incomplete enterprise restructuring and labor issues (such as overdue wages)  are also  a
potential  source of budgetary  pressures.  Wage  arrears are very high,  estimated  at about  15
billion denars, or 9% of GDP.  Typically wage arrears and arrears in social security contributions
will be paid by governments when they restructure or privatize government owned (these firms
may  be  taken  over  by  government  as  part  of  a  restructuring  program)  or  in  the  case  of
Macedonia,  socially owned  enterprises.'8 The government  may  explicitly pay  for  the wage
arrears or may accept a lower price in the privatization process while asking the future employer
to  deal with  labor  issues.  The total  magnitude of  arrears reported  here includes  arrears  of
privatized companies. The largest arrears, however (in terms of the number of months overdue)
16  The pay as you  go pension  system,  if unreforned could, in the long  run, add a substantial  amount  in net
liabilities to government.
17  There  are reports  that the govemment  is considering  taking  on some debt owed  to domestic  banks  by foreign
borrowers  but the amount  has not been  decided  yet. The above estimate  refers  to the cost of repaying  creditors  only,
not recapitalization  to achieve  positive  net worth.
18  Socially owned companies  are those which are owned by all - there are no clear owners in the sense of
shareholders
20are  in the  socially-owned  companies  A significant portion  of the  15 billion  denars  may  be
assumed  to be  wage  arrears  in these  companies. 19 In  some  companies, the  accumulation  of
arrears to  workers is avoided by accumulating arrears to  the government - as in  the case of
arrears in  electricity bills of major companies.  (Wage arrears have also been associated  with
arrears in tax payments-an  implicit fiscal expenditure). At the same time, enterprise adjustment
will require massive layoffs.  Estimates of over-staffing vary between 10 and 25% of the labor
force. Severance  costs alone  are estimated  at about 9  billion  denars.  20 The  Government  of
Macedonia, like other countries which had to go through such an adjustment process, has already
funded severance pay for some laid-off workers.
The above discussion shows the links between structural reforms and fiscal adjustment.
Problems in the enterprise and financial sectors lead to a buildup of implicit contingent
liabilities, at least some of  which, will eventually have to be paid.  Recognition of government's
contingent liabilities in the past has already created moral hazard in the financial and enterprise
sectors.  In the past, non-performing loans have been removed from the balance sheet of banks
and placed with a government agency, the Bank Rehabilitation Agency. However, repayments
on these loans are minimal and nonpaying enterprises continue to operate without undergoing
bankruptcy. In order to limit the distortion of private sector incentives by creating further moral
hazard, the government will need to find ways to limit repayment of its liabilities particularly in
the absence of legal and regulatory reform (i.e. without strengthening the incentives for good
performance). In cases where the net benefits from recognizing the contingent liabilities are
positive, there is a need to ensure that those who benefit from implicit or explicit guarantees are
required to bear some of losses.
'9  For  some  of the  calculations  it is later  assumed  that  around  1/3  of  the  total  amount  represents  wage  arrears  in
socially owned companies.
21In addition to those three major liabilities, other sources of fiscal risk in The FYR of
Macedonia include: (a) the restitution of expropriated land. The Macedonian government will be
giving away state-owned assets (or the equivalent value of land, previously expropriated in
transfer payments) to citizens. It is not possible to estimate the amount of this debt since even
the authorities do not know the value of the land covered; (b) guarantees provided by
commercial banks for loans to enterprises (mostly from abroad). If 40% of these liabilities are
called,21 and become expenses of the commercial banks, fiscal transfers may be involved.  40%
of the off balance sheet guarantees amount to 2.6% of GDP. (c) The guarantee of 35 million DM
for the privatization of the largest bank, Stopanska; (d) a one time repayment of arrears to the
health sector and in social payments (0.6% and 0.4% of GDP respectively); and (e) foreign
exchange risk associated with the frozen foreign currency liabilities or the Stopanska guarantee
or other sources; (f) pension liabilities. The Macedonian pay-as-you-go system was not in deficit
in 1998, but projections under optimistic growth and employment increases indicated that if
unreformed, it can run up substantial net liabilities for government over the long term.  Recent
events (war in the region) have changed the prognosis for the sustainability of the current
system; deficits are expected to appear in 1999. A further cause for worry is that changes in
pension benefits are sometimes implemented in an ad hoc manner.  Most recently, for example
the government announced a 10% increase in nominal pensions. 22
What is the impact of contingent liabilities on fiscal sustainability in Macedonia? First, a
"sustainable" fiscal deficit needs to be calculated.  The government  cash deficit, including the
20 This is estimated  by multiplying  the prevailing  average  wage  by 9 months (the average  length  of time for which
severance  pay may be paid).
21  This  is the percentage  of non-performing  loans  in the banking sector.
22 In previous  years  the government  had changed  the indexation  rule for pensions  which  had resulted  in a lower
value  for pensions. At a later  stage,  the Macedonian  court  ruled  this as unconstitutional  and  asked  the government
to pay its debt (the difference  in pensions  due to the difference  in indexation  rules).
22central bank, was used as the starting point. 23 The following assumptions were made (1) GDP
growth rises from 1.5% in 1997 to 4.5% and 5% in 2005; (2) inflation is kept at around 3% p.a.;
(3) stabilization and financial sector reform leads to an increase in money demand so that the
monetization ratio rises from  14.5% in 1997 to 24% in 2005; the ratio of public foreign debt to
GDP is kept at around 30% and foreign reserves are increased to reach 3 months of imports. 24
Table 9 below shows a possible scenario. The sustainable deficit is estimated around 1.5-2% of
GDP.  This is not a large number but it is larger than the cash deficit of today.
Table 9:  Estimating a Sustainable Fiscal Deficit
1997  1998  1999  2003  2005
Money creation  0.3  0.5  0.4  1.0  0.8
Foreign fnance  0.1  0.3  1.6  1.3  1.5
Debt finance  0.3  1.6  3.0  2.7  3.0
Reserves  -0.2  -1.3  -1.4  -1.4  -1.5
Domestic finance  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2  -0.4  -0.4
Gov. borrowing (from the rest of the economy).  -2.3  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.5
National Bank of FYR Macedonia credit  -2.0  0.4  0.7  0.9  0.9
Public sector deficit  0.0  0.4  1.8  1.9  1.9
Source:  1997 data from the Govermment  of Macedonia. Other  data  are  Bank staff projections
In the absence of other adjustments, the realization of some of the fiscal risks described
here could easily push the deficit beyond "sustainable" levels.  The debt implied by the frozen
foreign currency deposits would alone add 2.7% of GDP to the deficit.  Suppose the uncovered
exposure in the financial sector, amounting to 9% of GDP, and 1/3 of the implicit liabilities in
the enterprise sectors, are paid by the government.  Assume the authorities issue two bonds. The
maturity  structure  and interest rates  assumed  are: 15 years,  at  8.9% 25  and  10 years  7% 26
23 Profits and losses of public enterprises as well as capital transfers are included in the budget. To the extent that
public enterprises' activities (and prices) differ from market values these transfers will be net of the subsidy element
embodied in these prices.
24 If inflation were 10%, base money could grow much faster and revenues from the inflation tax would be higher.
With a more aggressive external debt strategy, the external debt stock might grow faster, allowing a higher deficit to
be financed. On the other hand, the GDP growth assumptions and assumptions regarding money demand are quite
optimistic given recent trends.
2  The discount rate of the central bank.
23respectively. The payment of these liabilities would increase annual expenditures by 1% of GDP.
A one-time payment for the Stopanska  guarantee (worth 35 million DM) would add another 1%
of GDP. Exchange rate shifts would add to the payments the government would have to make.
A 10% devaluation would add another 0.3% of GDP.  If the interest rate on the bonds used to
repay the frozen household deposits were to rise to 8.9% (the discount rate), the repayments
could be 1% of GDP higher per year in the first 6 years. A 10% devaluation at this rate would
add over 1% of GDP to annual payments over a similar time frame. In other words, the fiscal
deficit is in danger of being pushed to unsustainable levels due to the accumulation of contingent
liabilities even if the traditional deficit analysis indicates otherwise.
It is important to note however, that even without the accumulation of contingent
liabilities, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's  fiscal stance may not be sustainable.
The "traditional" analysis of sustainability would highlight issues such as falling tax revenues
(falling from 39%  of GDP in 1994 to 31.2% of GDP in 1998), low civil service wages and high
civil service employment.  Add to this a very low level of investment to GDP (1.6%) which
country experience suggests, is hardly enough to maintain the value of current investments.  Put
differently, de-accumulation of liabilities has been one of the major elements of the adjustment
strategy, which along with the accumulation of liabilities has affected net worth of government
negatively.
When governments recognize their previously implicit contingent liabilities, payment on
these debts need not have large effects on the fiscal deficit (though it may on future financing
requirements). For example, non-interest bearing bonds, or bonds with very low interest rates
could be used to replace implicit debt.  Dealing with banking sector liabilities for example, can
26 The rate on IBRD  loans.  A previous  IBRD loan  included  restructuring  of enterprises  and payment  of wage arrears
and severance.  Even  if only  the social  contributions  due on wage arrears  are recognized,  they would  amount  to 6.3%
24be thought of  in two parts:  (a)  making depositors whole and (b) recapitalization in order to
enable the bank to continue functioning.  While the former requires real resources from the
government, the latter need not.  As an example, in order to increase the capital of a bank, the
government could take a zero interest loan from the bank and buy equity in the same bank.
Depending on the interest rate and the maturity structure that government chooses for its debt
and depending also on the total value of contingent liabilities that it recognizes, the fiscal effects
may be starkly different. When the government recognizes losses already incurred in the
financial and enterprise sectors and determines repayment terms it will really be making a
decision about how to distribute the losses within the economy.  The greater the fiscal effect, the
greater is the cost to general taxpayers as opposed to for example, depositors in and shareholders
of banks, workers in enterprises and landowners in FYR of Macedonia.  It will need to make
decisions such as : if a bank makes poor loans and incurs losses, how much of the cost should be
borne by the managers and how much by the depositors/ taxpayers?  By recapitalizing banks
with bonds, it is merely recognizing losses that have already been incurred. The higher the
interest rate on the bonds the larger the transfer of resources from taxpayers to
shareholders/depositors.27 Moreover, the government has to weigh the moral hazard issue
related to bank recapitalization with the threat of systemic risk and potentially negative effects on
output in the absence of recapitalization. These are not easy decisions to make.
Unlike the case for explicit contingent liabilities, implementing fiscal planning which
would account for the potential fiscal risks associated with implicit contingent liabilities is
generally much more difficult. 28 First, implicit contingent liabilities may grow because of large
of GDP.  Severance  payment  is estimated  for 15%  of the employed  (on average  this seems  to be a reasonable  number
for the redundancy  in enterprises).
27 If bonds are continuously rolled over then the government effectively never repays the principal.  In cases where
this is not so, the government will have to find alternative sources of financing to repay the bonds.
28 For example, a guarantee contract can be written precisely and narrowly defined.  For implicit contingent
liabilitiess, the amount depends to a large extent on the political considerations at that particular time.
25macro shocks (whose magnitude and impact on the overall economy may be hard to determine).
For small shocks (such as small exchange rate changes), it is generally possible to estimate, for
example, effects on specific agents, such as banks. But the govemment liability depends on the
uncovered exposure of banks, and the creditors it wants to reimburse.  Even if supervisors know
the status of bank assets and capital precisely 29 at a point in time, these values change
continuously, and supervisors may not share infornation  with the fiscal authorities. Another
complication arises from the fact that if governments explicitly account for the potential
realization of implicit contingent liabilities, they may generate or significantly increase moral
hazard (unless agents also believe ex ante that those responsible for poor credit decisions
(managers/shareholders) will be forced to bear sufficiently large losses.
Fiscal authorities should recognize that (a) small open economies and emerging markets
are especially prone to shocks (being relatively undiversified) and (b) banks and firms in small
emerging economies will be exposed to more risk due to this susceptibility to shocks in the real
economy as well as financial shocks. Therefore fiscal prudence and good debt management are
very important. 30 It is more so since fiscal, monetary exchange rate outcomes are closely linked.
As contingent liabilities are accumulated the net worth of government falls (all else being
equal).3'  This tendency will be exacerbated if cash payments for interest liabilities crowds out
investment or asset accumulation, which has been the case in FYR of Macedonia.  Therefore the
true fiscal adjustment in the Macedonian economy has been smaller than a consideration of the
cash deficits may indicate.  It is also true that payment for implicit contingent liabilities in FYR
29 This is highly likely in most emerging economies, given information scarcities, lack of reliable accounting etc.
30 Burnside et al (1999) have shown that the large prospective deficits implied by the poor health of the banking
sectors in East Asian countries, such as Korea and Thailand were an important trigger of "cause" of the loss of
investor confidence.
31 In this discussion we are implicitly assuming that the cost of the debt taken on by the government is greater than
the gain which might accrue (such as faster growth and restructuring) from the redistribution of claims. Such gains
are possible in the case where the government is redistributing claims in the aftermath of a systemic crisis or when
fundamental policy changes (and incentive changes) accompany the redistribution of claims.
26of Macedonia has exacerbated moral hazard and can lead to a further accumulation of implicit
contingent liabilities in the future, in the absence of strong reforms.  It is relatively easy to
change balance sheets of banks and firms for example, without strengthening incentives for
improved performance which would prevent the further accumulation of losses.
5.  Concluding Remarks
Our work in the Czech Republic and in Macedonia demonstrates the importance of
including contingent liabilities when assessing the magnitude of the true fiscal adjustment, and
when analyzing fiscal sustainability. To the extent that explicit expenditures are shifted off-
budget or replaced by the issuance of guarantees the achieved improvement in fiscal balances is
overstated.  For the Czech Republic we find that adjustment may have been over-stated by some
3-4 of GDP annually.  The accumulation of contingent liabilities today is a threat to future fiscal
stability. Hence, a stabilization program that is accompanied by a build-up of contingent
liabilities may not be sustainable.  In the case of Macedonia we found that the present fiscal
equilibrium may be temporary, because the stock of existing contingent liabilities could add 2-
4% of GDP to future deficits.  Moreover, the methods used to reduce the "traditional" deficit are
unlikely to be sustainable without further modification.  Our work also shows that fiscal
adjustment and structural reforms are closely linked.  The most obvious example is that failure to
improve banking sector performance can over time lead to an accumulation of implicit
contingent liabilities for governments.
There are three areas where further work is clearly needed.  First, there is a need for
governments to develop better techniques for identifying and evaluating contingent liabilities
arising from the banking system (Honohan, 1999 develops general guidelines), non-banking
financial institutions, state guarantees, public enterprises or contingent and direct liabilities of
27sub-national  governments.  Second,  governments  need  to apply  techniques  to manage  their risks,
for instance  build adequate  reserve  funds and  hedge risk when plausible. Third,  the implications
of the analysis  for budget  management  and for administrative  reform  need to be developed.
Today  politicians  in many  countries  have an incentive  to create  more contingent  liabilities:  they
allow  them to cater to requests  from different  constituencies  while  maintaining  deficit targets,
and  they are not subjected  to the same level of scrutiny  by Cabinet  and Parliament  as direct
spending. Future  work could  help develop  alternative  systems  that would  remove  this bias for
more contingent  liabilities.
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30Annex 1
Non-standard Operations of the Czech National Bank
Since 1993, Czech National Bank has undertaken a large amount of non-standard
operations, most of which have been aimed at consolidating and stabilizing the banking sector.
Table 1 provides a summary of the assets, held by the central bank as a result of non-standard
operations by the end of 1998. The table also indicates the quality of these assets and their
coverage by state guarantees and provisions.
Table 1.  Non-Standard Operations of the Czech National Bank (CZK bn)
Asset  Amount  as of  Default  Risk  Covered  by  a  Provisioned
31.12.  1998  state  Guarantee
Assets  purchased  from  banks  0.65+  100%  0.27+  0.4
Receivables  from  Banks  13.01  100%  10.1  2.9
Receivable  from  the National  Bank of  26.1+  63%  0  16.4
Slovakia
Redistribution  credit  to Konsolidacni  32.5  *  0  0.35+
Banka
Receivables  from  Special  Clients  0.4  63%  0  0.3
Credit  commitments  and guarantees  51.4  34%  7.6  9.6
Ceska  Financni  (Consolidation  37.1  76%  0  28.0
Program  and AGB,  excluding
Stabilization  Program  covered  by
KOB)
Total  161.1  18.0  57.9
*  KOB  obligations  are guaranteed  by the state.
Source: Czech  National  Bank.
31Annex 2
Government Guarantees: Contribution to Hidden Deficit and Hidden Public Liabilities
And Future Claims on the Budget
Contribution to hidden deficit
Contribution  to  hidden  deficit  is  estimated  as  net  hidden  subsidy provided  through
guarantees in a given year  from the portfolio of guarantees issued in that year.  Hidden subsidy
of a guarantee represents the fiscal cost of government obligations, which will emerge from the
guarantee in the future.  If the  amount of hidden subsidy had been transferred to a guarantee
reserve fund the same year the guarantee was issued, it would serve to  cover potential future
claims emerging from the guarantee.  In the future, the cost of guarantee default would be paid
from the guarantee reserve fuid  and thus not affect the budget and the deficit.
For the calculation, each guarantee and its underlying project are assessed.  Projects are
ranked according to their risk.  Accordingly, the default  risk of each  guarantee is estimated.
Risk-adjusted amount (hidden subsidy) of state guarantees is calculated by multiplying the loan
amount for which a guarantee was issued and its default risk.  To avoid double accounting, net
hidden subsidy, or the contribution to  hidden deficit, in a  given year, is set to equal the total
hidden  subsidy provided in  a  given year minus  guarantee  claims paid  from  the budget  and
reported in budget deficit that year. Tables  1 and 2 show the calculation.  Table  1 shows the
amount of guarantees issued each year according to their risk ranking.  Table 2 provides the risk-
adjusted  amounts of  guarantees  issued  each  year  and  the  claims  paid  from  the  budget  on
guarantee defaults each year.
32Table 1. Guarantees Issued (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Very high (90%)  0  0  0  10.8  51.7  31.0
High (30%)  0  0  0  16.2  20.3  0
Medium  (15%)  5.0  0  13.3  3.0  5.8  7.8
Low(5%)  3.7  0  1.8  0  0  87.0
Total  8.7  0  15.1  30.0  77.8  125.8
Table 2.  Contribution to Hidden Deficit (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Very  high (90%)  0  0  0  9.7  46.5  27.9
High  (30%)  0  0  0  4.9  6.1  0
Medium  (15%)  0.7  0  2.0  0.4  0.9  1.2
Low (5%)  0.2  0  0.1  0  0  4.4
Sub Total  0.9  0  2.1  15.0  53.5  33.4
Budget  paid out (-)  -0.8  -0.4  -0.8  -0.1  -2.0  -6.7'
Total  0.1  -0.4  1.3  14.9  51.5  26.7
(as % of GDP)  0.0  -0.0  0.1  1.0  3.1  1.5
Contribution to hidden public liabilities.
Calculation of the contribution to hidden public liabilities is similar to the calculation
above, but is applied to the portfolio of guarantees outstanding, rather than issued, each year.
See tables 3 and 4 for the figures.
Table 3.  Government Guaranteed Debt Outstanding  (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Very  high (90%)  0  0  0  23.4  66.5  96.4
High (30%)  0  0  0  1.6  19.0  35.0
Medium  (15%)  4.7  3.7  13.2  16.0  18.7  24.7
Low  (5%)  40.2  46.9  70.1  88.7  113.7  128.8
Total  45.0  50.6  83.3  129.7  217.9  284.8
33Table 4. Contribution to Hidden Public Liabilities (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Veryhigh(90%)  0  0  0  21.1  59.9  86.8
High  (30%)  0  0  0  0.5  5.7  10.5
Medium  (15%)  0.7  0.6  2.0  2.4  2.8  3.7
Low (5%)  2.0  2.3  3.5  4.4  5.7  6.4
Total  2.7  2.9  5.5  28.4  74.1  107.4
(as  % of GDP)  0.3  0.3  0.4  1.9  4.5  6.0
Future claims on the budget.
Future claims on the budget are estimated from the portfolio of guarantees outstanding in
1998. The assumption is that no new guarantees will be issued (hidden deficit emerging from
guarantees will thus be zero). Again, each guarantee and its underlying project are assessed.
Projects are ranked according to their risk.  Accordingly, the default risk of each guarantee is
estimated.  Then, from payment schedule of the underlying loan under a guarantee, each year's
installment is multiplied by the default risk and considered to be the potential claim on state
budget.
Potential demands on state budget. In the next several years the government can expect a
rapid increase in guaranty claim payments due to the default of borrowers that exhibited
questionable repayment capacity even at the time the guaranty was extended.  Moreover, if the
current incentive structure remains unaltered, the government's potential liabilities could
increase dramatically.
A review of current state guarantees and the likely demands for government resources to
cover claim payments is shown in table 532  The current outstanding loans are grouped by very
32  For variable  rate loans,  only 1999  figures  reflect scheduled  payments  of principal  and interest. Scheduled
payments in the remaining years are only for principal.  For fLxed  rate loans, scheduled principal and interest are
included for all years.
34high,  high, medium, and low risk projects. 33 These groups are provided to  show the varying
levels of risk within the portfolio, rather than to provide a  specific assessment  of individual
projects.  A more comprehensive review would be necessary to provide a true assessment of the
current condition of the guaranty portfolio.
Table 5.  Scheduled Payments for state Guaranteed Loans (CZK bn)
Project Risk Ranking  '98  Scheduled Payments
Balance
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 1999-2003
Very high  96.404  1.491  2.286  2.610  34.349  3.239  43.975
High  34.953  4.795  7.792  8.604  6.594  1.336  29.121
Medium  24.657  2.333  2.525  2.286  1.943  1.898  10.985
Low  128.771  3.747  2.041  1.959  1.987  1.823  11.557
Total  284.785  12.366  14.644  15.459  44.873  8.296  95.638
Table  6  provides  an  assessment  of  the  potential  claims  on  the  state  budget  if  the
guaranteed loans  defaulted at the rates shown in the second  column of this table.  This  table
shows the illustrative  claims consistent with  the  government's  incentives to  continue to  pay
scheduled  loan  payments.  The annual  potential  claims  on  state  budget  are  calculated  by
multiplying the default probability in table 6 by the annual scheduled payments in table 5.
33  These categories have been defined for illustrative purposes as follows. "Very high" risk guarantee includes
those that have already missed payments (Railways - CZK 40.6bn and hospitals - CZK 2.3bn) and few other
guarantees, such as the guarantee extended to CNB for transition debt assumed from banks (CZK 22.5bn) and the
guarantee of CSOB debt (CZK 31  .Obn). "High" risk guarantees include those extended to borrowers with low
repayment capacity, for example, JE Temelin, new debt issued to Area to cover a prior default, and the center for
blood fractioning (Vystavba frakcionaeniho centra krevnich derivAt4).  "Low" risk guarantees include those with a
borrower who demonstrated repayment capacity. "Medium" risk includes all other loans. These categories were
established based on general assessments provided to World Bank mission in November  1998. They do not reflect
the actual risk of individual projects.  A detailed assessment would be required to provide informed estimates of the
credit risk of individual projects.
35Table 6. Expected claims on state Budget Resulting from state Guarantees (CZK bn)
Project Risk  Default Risk  Total Claim  Potential Claims on state Budget
Ranking
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  1999-2003
Very high  90%  86.764  1.342  2.057  2.349  30.914  2.915  39.578
High  30%  10.486  1.439  2.338  2.581  1.978  401  8.736
Medium  15%  3.699  350  379  343  291  285  1.648
Low  5%  6.439  187  102  98  99  91  578
Total  107.387  3.318  4.876  5.371  33.283  3.692  50.539
These estimates show that the government could make payments from CZK3.3 billion to
33.3 billion  annually in the near term. 34  (The projected payments in  2002 jump  due to  the
scheduled repayment of the CSOB CZK3 1.0 million loan in that year.)  In later years expected
claim  payments  could jump  significantly  as  larger  principal  payments  come  due.  If  the
illustrative risk categories and default probabilities were realized, the government would make
claim payments of CZKl 07.4bn over the remaining life of the current portfolio, plus interest and
penalties.  These rough estimates do not  include the potential cost of the CZK17.6bn in  loan
guaranty commitments expected for disbursement in 1999.
If more conservative assumptions were used, the claims on budget resources could be
even larger.  For example, if one assumed a 100% default probability for very high risks, 50%
for high risks, 25% for medium risks, and  10% for low risks, gross principal defaults over the
remaining life of the current portfolio would reach CZK132.9bn.  Actual losses would be higher
as the result of additional payments for guaranteed interest and penalties.
Tables  below  provide  background  information regarding  the  guarantee  portfolio  and
guarantee risk.
34  These annual budgetary costs do not include the likely payment of up to CZK22.5 bn to the CNB, because
payments for this guaranteed loan is not scheduled until 2007.  If this guaranty were called earlier, the expected
annual budgetary costs would increase by this amount.
36Table 7. Government Credit Guarantees Issued 1993-1999 (currency as indicated)
Year  Amount (in million)
Projekt ENERGY I  1992  394.026 USD
Odsffeni elektrarny Pocerady  1992  900 CZK
Odsifeni elektrarny Prunefov  1992  59.200 DEM
JE Temelin - automat.system fizeni  1996  514.800 USD
Pohizeni letadel Boeing  1993  164.101 USD
Leasing letadel Airbus  1995  122.228 USD
Vystavba terninalu  v Praze-Ruzyni  1995  6,980 CZK
Projekt TELEKOMUNIKACE I - *)  1993  105.765 ECU
Projekt TELEKOMUNIKACE I I (dodat.pujcka)  1995  50.739 ECU
I. koridor DMin-Praha-Bfeclav  -CD,  1.  uver  1996  320.100 USD
I. koridor Decin-Praha-Bfeclav - 2. Uver EIB  1997  75 ECU
II. koridor BIeclav-Plferov-Petrovice  1997  23,500 CZK
Modernizace kolejovych vozidel CD - 1. iver  1996  1,100 CZK
Modernizace kolejovych vozidel CD - 2. uiver  1997  500 CZK
Zlepgeni stavu mezinArodnich  silnic - 3 trange  1996  3,000 CZK
Projekt dAlnice  D5 Praha-Norimnberk  (L trange)  1997  165 ECU
Projekt rozvoje obci - MUFIS (1.transe)  1995  59.9 USD
Projekt rozvoje obci - MUFIS (2.transe)  1997  27.6 USD
Projekt  rozvoje  obci  - MUFIS  (3.trange)  1998  26.015USD
Severoceske papirny Steti  1988  103 CZK
Vystavba frakcionacniho centra krevnich derivAtu  1996  600 CZK
Seriovd vyroba letadel L-159 pro CA (CIBC banka)  1997  669 USD
Projekt na odstrantni skod z povodni  1998  200 ECU
VFN Praha  a FN Motol  1997  2,565  CZK
Vyroba letadel L- 159 a rozvoj Aera:  revolving.uver  1998  300 USD
Aero Vodochody a.s.  - emise dluhopisu  1998  200 USD
Kongresove centrum Praha dostavba a rekonstr.  1998  2,000 CZK
Projekt rozvoje obci - MUFIS, 4. Transe  1998-9  8 USD
Projekt ceske dalnice -A (D8,DI 1,RI,R35)  1998  230 ECU
Statni zaruka ve prospech CNB (usn.vl. c. 51/1997)  1997  22,500 CZK
Statni  zaruka pro CSOB za SI (usn.vl.c. 269/1998)  1998  31,000 CZK
37Table 8.  Government Guarantees: Summary, 1993-1999 (CZK bn)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999*
A. Developmentgtys  (576/90 Sb.)  45.963  75.945  113.862  99.694  143.188  135.513  136.328
1.  Outstanding  21.425  30.057  40.063  62.176  103.608  117.913  118.728
Committed (approvedby  the gvt  24.538  45.888  73.799  37.518  39.580  17.600  17.600
but not legaly bending)
B.  Other guarantees  0  1.412  0  0  22.500  53.500  37.952
C.  Solidarity guarantees  26.697  23.025  18.241  10.176  8.177  4.372  4.372
Total guarantees outstanding  72.660  100.382  132.103  109.870  173.865  193.385  177.780
A+B+C
Legal linit  on scheduled payments  28.160  30.400  32.940  39.792  43.928  42.931  45.929
Scheduled payments  5.429  5.607  10.629  8.893  9.001  11.080  12.366
Capital reserves
Guaranty claims budgeted for  600  1.000  1.000  300  500  800  1.500
Actual guaranty claims paid  822  419  789  91  1.988  6.700  0
D. Export guarantees (58/95 Sb.)
EGAP  0  0  24.200  34.400  48.000  70.000  70.000
CEB  0  0  4.252  28.000  39.000  39.000  39.000
.Total state guarantees outstanding  72.660  100.382  160.555  172.270  260.865  302.385  286.780
A+B+C+D
* 1999  is estimated.
Source: Ministry  of Finance.
38Table 9.  Guarantees and Their Risk Assessment (CZK m)
CZK mln  CZK mln
1.Statni  zaruky poskytnute za uiviry
a) Environment projects total  15,79  104  11,944  1138  29824,212
ztoho: Projekt ENERGY I  1992  USDl  Low  11,387  10 971  9,937  9554  11,475  9380
Odsi0eni elektrarny Po&erady  1992  CZK  Low  90  900  900  791  682  463
Odsioenl elektramy Prun,oov  1992  DEM  Low  1,13  1,062  1,10  1,041  941  680
JE Temelfn  - dostavba III. a IV. Bloku  N  82  109
JE Temelln - automat.system 01zenf  1996  USD  0ligh  |  0  0  16,885  13,68
Konax Jihiava  Defaul  224
AZNP Mlada Boleslav  Default  51
Mesit Uherske Hradiste  Defaul  19
Mesit Uherske Hradiste  Dcfaul  53
Zetor  Defaul  737
Mitas  Defaul
b) Infrastructure projects total  4,74  15,23  26,28  44,84  65,55  64,38
ztoho:  Pou(zenl letadel Boeing  1993  USD  Mediu  4,74  3,695  2,40  2,15  3,111  2,138
Leasing letadel Airbus  1995  USD  Medium  3,841  3,43  3,38  1,52
Projekt rozvoje obci  1995  NA  56  1,62  812  0  0
Vystavba terminalu v Praze-Ruzyni  1995  CZK  Mediu0  6,985  6,81  6,50  5,758
Projekt TELEKOMUNIKACE 1  1993  ECU  Low  10,977  10,101  3,388  3,60  2,985
Projekt TELEKOMUNIKACE I I (dodat.pt1j6ka)  1995  ECU  Low  0  1,32  1,29  1,70  1,788
I. koridor Dlefn-Praha-B0eclav -ED, 1. Uvir  1996  USD  Defaul  0  0  23,39  17,04  17,13
I. koridor Dlin-Praha-B0eclav  -2. 6vir  EIB  1997  ECU  Defaul  |  0  0  1
II. koridor B0eclav-P0erov-Petrovice  1997  CZK  Default  0  0  23,50  17,99
Modernizace kolejovsch vozidel ED - 1. Uvir  1996  CZK  Defaul  00  70
39Modernizace kolejovych vozidel tD -2. (Jvir  1997  CZ  Defaul  0  0  0  0  40
Zlepseni stavu mezinirodnich silnic -3 transe  1996  CZK  Mediu  0  0  3,54  2,91  792
Projekt dfinice D5 Praha-Norimberk (1.  trange)  1997  ECU  Mediu  0  0  0  5,575
Projekt rozvoje obef -MUFIS (1. a 2.transe)  1995  USD  Mediu  0  0  0  2,80  2,39
Projekt rozvoje obol -MUFIS (3.transe)  1998  US  Medium  0  0  0  77
c) Foreign projects total  88:  1,78  1,83  5,34  5,576  27,061
z toho:  Severoeesk6 papimy Mti  1988  993  1995  Low  103  103  103  103
PBS Vgstavba hlinklarny v Iranu - EGAP - Defaul  78  783  79  12
4x64MW
Vystavba hlinklarny v Iranu - Chepos  Defaul  1,00  1,000  3,53  3,40
Vystavba frakcionaeniho centra krevnich  1996  CZK  Hig  0  0  0  60  60
deriv&tfti
Seriovav~roba letadel L-159 pro tA  (CIBC  1997  USD  Higl  0  0  1,58  1,46  20,66
banka)
Projekt na odstraninf skod z povodni  1998  EC  Mediu  0  0  0  0  5,69
Ostatni  N  0  754
d) podle § 32: hospitals  0  0  2,49  2,255
z toho:  VFN Praha a FN Motol  1997  CZ  Default  0  0  2,494  2,255
Total 1  21,421  30,05  40,0C  61,S7  103,60  117,91
40.VI&dou  schvalene  ziruky,  u nichz  se p0ipravuji  fiv1rov6,  zArueni  Odb0rnj
smiouvy, splitkove  kalendaee  odhad
Vfroba letadel  L-159  a rozvoj  Aera:  1998  USD  Higl  9,10
revolving.dvir
Aero  Vodochody  a.s. -emise  dluhopisdl  1998  USD  High  6,1C
Kongresove  centrum  Praha  dostavba  a rekonstr.  1998  CZK  High  2,0C
Projekt  rozvoje  obcf  -MUFIS,  4. Transe  1998-9  Mediu  0
Projekt  eeske  dalnice  -A (D8,DI  I,RI,R35)  1998  ECU  Medium  40
New  projects  shown  in prior  years  24,53  45,88  73,791  38,11  39,58
Total  2  24,53  45,88  73,799  38,11  39,58  17,60
Total A (1 + 2)  45,963  75,94  113,86  99,69  143,18  135,51
Ostatni  uvery  1,412
- __--_-  N  N  N  N_ Statni  ziruka ve prospech  CNB  (usnMv.  c.  199  Hi  22,50  22,50
5111997)
Statnf zaruka pro  CSOB  za SI  (usn.vl.c.  199  Hig  31,00
69/1998)
Grand Total A + B + C  72,66  100,38  132,10  109,87  173,866  193,38
8 % of state revenues
Amowunt  below state limnit
z toho  Z_uk  za z_ak  exotnoi§on  - EGPLo  _  4  24,2  34,40  48,0  70,OC
Zaruky za zaivazky exportni banky  -CEB  .Lovw  0  4,252  28,00  39,001  39,00C
Total A+B+C+D  |  72,669  100,381  160,551  172,2711  260,86  302,38
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